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Abstract
Information-theoretic secret-key agreement is perhaps the most practically feasible mechanism that provides
unconditional security at the physical layer to date. In this paper, we consider the problem of secret-key agreement
by sharing randomness at low power over an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) link, in the
presence of an eavesdropper. The low power assumption greatly simplifies the design of the randomness sharing
scheme, even in a fading channel scenario. We assess the performance of the proposed system in terms of secrecy
key rate and show that a practical approach to key sharing is obtained by using low-density parity check (LDPC)
codes for information reconciliation. Numerical results confirm the merits of the proposed approach as a feasible
and practical solution. Moreover, the outage formulation allows to implement secret-key agreement even when only
statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper channel is available.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems and networks are particularly prone to attacks, because the inherent
broadcast nature of the radio channel makes any terminal in the transmission range a potential threat.
Physical-layer security aims at strengthening these systems by exploiting the imperfections of communi-
cation channels with appropriate coding and signaling strategies at the physical layer. Since the seminal
works [1]–[3], physical-layer security has mainly focused on two mechanisms: secret communication over
the wiretap channel, and secret-key agreement with the aid of a public side channel.
While several results have established the benefits of diversity, fading [4], and multiple antenna [5], [6],
to improve secret-key rates over wireless channels, little has been done to analyze secret-key agreement
in the context of OFDM systems, which have become the reference wireless physical layer technique
for high data rate wireless communications. Previous work on secret-key agreement in OFDM systems
and fading environments has used a source model for secret-key agreement based on channel reciprocity
[7], so that separate measurements of the channel coefficients of the wireless link between the legitimate
terminals could be used as the shared randomness. Other related works have also considered the problem
of secure communication over OFDM channels by modeling them as parallel wiretap channels [8], [9],
based on the fact that an OFDM system is designed to avoid interference among subchannels and among
symbols. However, a sophisticated eavesdropper may refuse to implement the canonical OFDM receiver,
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Fig. 1. Block diagram for the vector/matrix representation of a secret key agreement scheme based on OFDM.
keeping the cyclic prefix (CP) samples to increase the amount of information he can get out of it, and
thus creating interference among the wiretap channels.
In this paper, we consider the problem of generating secret cryptographic keys over a wireless channel
by using OFDM transmission with CP for randomness sharing. We consider a channel model for secret-
key agreement, in which randomness is injected into the channel by one of the legitimate terminals.
Moreover, we analyze slow fading dispersive channels, for which the channel impulse responses are
assumed to remain constant over the whole duration of the randomness sharing phase. We first show that
in the low-power limit the strategy to allocate all transmit power on the subchannel having the highest
channel gain to the legitimate receiver is first-order optimal. We derive the secret key achievable rates in
this case, and observe that first-order optimality is retained by replacing Gaussian inputs with a quaternary
phase shift keying (QPSK) constellation with the same variance. Then, as a practical solution, we propose
the use of LDPC coding for information reconciliation. Indeed, LDPC codes are state-of-the-art error
correcting codes, characterized by soft decoding algorithms able to approach the unconstrained channel
capacity, with limited complexity. They have already found several applications in physical-layer security,
either as codes for near-optimal information reconciliation in secret-key agreement schemes [10]–[12], or
as codes for secure communication over wiretap channels [13], [14]. In order to assess the merit of the
practical solution we also consider as performance metric the security gap defined as the ratio between the
legitimate and eavesdropper signal to noise ratio (SNR) which allows reliable decoding for the legitimate
receiver, while keeping the eavesdropper bit error rate (BER) and frame error rate (FER) sufficiently
close to 0.5 and 1, respectively. We focus on regular LDPC codes, since both their optimization and
implementation are simpler than for irregular codes. In addition, regular LDPC codes also include several
classes of structured codes [15], which are well suited to practical implementation [16]. Lastly, we discuss
the design of the system based on an outage approach, when the channel of the eavesdropper is known
only statistically to the legitimate transmitter.
We denote vectors and matrices with lowercase and uppercase boldface letters, respectively, and the
complex conjugate transposed of matrix A as with A∗. The eigenvalues of an L×L matrix A are denoted
by λi(A), i = 1, . . . , L. Given a vector g ∈ CL, we denote by ToepN (g) the (N + L− 1)×N Toeplitz
matrix having [g1, 0, . . . , 0] as its first row and [g1, . . . , gL, 0, . . . , 0] as its first column.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the typical physical-layer key-agreement scenario, two legitimate terminals, which we call A and B,
aim at deriving a common bit sequence (the key) that must be kept secret from an adversary who will
be called E. For this purpose, A and B have access to a noisy wireless link and to a public, error-free
authenticated channel. However, it is assumed that, due to the nature of the wireless medium, a link also
exists from A to E and that messages on the public channel may be observed by E.
We consider that the wireless link is implemented through an OFDM system with M subcarriers, equally
spaced in frequency, and a CP of µ samples. For convenience, we use the matrix representation of the
OFDM/CP system introduced in [17], that can be inferred from Fig. 1. The description is based on the
discrete time equivalent of the system with N samples per symbol period, and its efficient implementation
through the fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm. We assume that the CP is longer than the main channel
impulse response gR in order to avoid intersymbol interference (ISI) and interchannel interference (ICI) at
the legitimate receiver. The input-output relationships are then a special case of the multiple input multiple
output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel:
y = GRx+wR
and z = GEx +wE
(1)
where the vector x ∈ CN contains the signal samples corresponding to an OFDM symbol, transmitted on
the channel, while multiplications of x by the Toeplitz matrices GR = ToepN (gR) and GE = ToepN (gE)
are the convolutions of the input signal with the channel impulse responses gR = [gR(0), . . . , gR(LR − 1)]
and gE = [gE(0), . . . , gE(LE − 1)], having lengths LR and LE, respectively. The noise vectors wR,wE ∼
CN (0, IN+Li−1), with i = R,E, comprise independent, zero-mean, unit-variance, circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian variables.
To impose the OFDM structure on the transmitted signal, we write
x = Tu, (2)
where the vector u ∈ CM contains the frequency domain symbols loaded on the M subcarriers. The
OFDM modulation matrix T is an N ×M matrix that can be written as T = AF∗, in which F represents
the FFT matrix of size M , while A ∈ CN×M is responsible for inserting µ = N −M redundant samples
that are needed to overcome the delay spread of the dispersive channel, i.e.,
A =
[
0 Iµ
IM
]
. (3)
Similarly, demodulation at the receiver is represented by the multiplication v = Ry of the legitimate
channel output by the matrix R = FB. Here B is such that under the condition LR ≤ µ,
RGRT = diag(GR(fi)), (4)
in which GR(fi), i = 1, . . . ,M is the length M FFT of the legitimate channel impulse response. Thus,
B =
[
0M×µ IM 0M×(LR−1)
]
. (5)
Given the above, the OFDM system scenario with generic eavesdropper can be represented as an equivalent
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel:
v = HRu+w
′
R
and z = HEu+wE
(6)
with HR = diag(GR(fi)), HE = GET and w′R = RwR. Consequently, the covariance matrix of the
demodulated noise at the legitimate receiver is K
w
′
R
= RR∗ = IM .
III. LOW POWER RANDOMNESS SHARING AND ACHIEVABLE SECRET-KEY RATES
From known results regarding the MIMO Gaussian wiretap model, the secret-key capacity with a given
input covariance matrix Ku is obtained with Gaussian inputs, and is given by [6]
R = log2
∣∣∣I+K 12u (H∗RHR +H∗EHE)K 12u∣∣∣− log2 ∣∣∣I+K 12uH∗EHEK 12u∣∣∣ . (7)
On the other hand, from [6, Proposition 2], we also know that, in the low-power regime, i.e. when the
available power P goes to zero, the optimal transmission strategy is to concentrate all the power along
the eigenspace of the legitimate channel HR corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue, regardless of
the eavesdropper’s channel. In our case, the optimal input covariance matrix that satisfies the total power
constraint
tr (Kx) = tr(TKuT
∗) ≤ P , (8)
is diagonal, with only one nonzero entry, corresponding to the subcarrier that exhibits the maximum
channel gain. Namely,
Ku =
P
1 + ρ
eme
∗
m, (9)
in which ρ = µ/M , {ei} is the canonical base of RM and
m = argmax
i
|λi(H∗RHR)| = argmax
i
|GR(fi)| . (10)
Accordingly, the secret-key rate achieved for P > 0 with the low-power optimal transmission strategy is
R = log2
1 + P
1+ρ
|GR(fm)|2 + P1+ρ‖HEem‖2
1 + P
1+ρ
‖HEem‖2
= log2
1 + ΛR + ΛE
1 + ΛE
(11)
where ΛR = P1+ρ |GR(fm)|2 and ΛE = P1+ρ‖HEem‖2 are the SNR of the two channels, relative to the
chosen subcarrier.
Moreover, by leveraging the low-power, first-order expansion of mutual information in [18], the result in
[6, Proposition 2] can be extended to any complex input with the same covariance matrix, and independent
real and imaginary components. Therefore, in the low-power regime, Gaussian signaling is no longer
necessary to achieve the secret-key capacity of the channel, and A can transmit symbols from a discrete
constellation (e.g., QPSK) without incurring significant losses with respect to expression (11) 1.
IV. PRACTICAL SOLUTION
The choice of a QPSK modulation for randomness sharing simplifies the design of the information
reconciliation phase. Indeed, as reconciliation of continuous variables is not needed, it can be effectively
implemented through standard soft decoding techniques of a binary code in an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel with binary input. For instance, [12] employs fixed LDPC codes with syndrome
transmission on the public feedback channel.
In this section, as an alternative to the standard reconciliation scheme, we derive a suboptimal, still more
convenient, practical approach. We first observe that since the transmitter chooses the best subchannel
to the legitimate receiver, it is quite likely that ΛR > ΛE. Therefore, the proposed approach is to use
the resulting wiretap channel (said to be stochastically degraded) to deliver a secret key created at the
transmitter, without leveraging the presence of a public, noiseless, side channel for discussion.
1An analogous result holds for low-power secrecy capacity of a MIMO Gaussian channel [19].
As a further step towards practice, we consider finite length codes. In this context, we aim for a looser
notion of secrecy, based on the eavesdropper BER rather than mutual information.
We now focus on the use of LDPC codes as secrecy codes for the wiretap channel. We observe that
their behavior can be approximated by assuming that if the SNR working point Λ is close to the decoding
threshold Λth, a small decrease of Λ would cause the code to be unable to correct the errors. On the
other hand, a small increase of Λ would allow to decode correctly all of them. The threshold Λth will
be derived in the following. Under the physical-layer security viewpoint, the ideal condition would be
reached if an eavesdropper at ΛE = Λth−ε, with ε arbitrarily small, was unable to get any information on
the received codewords, while the authorized receiver at ΛR = Λth+ ε can perfectly recover the message.
In this case, the security gap Sg = ΛR/ΛE needed to achieve the security and reliability conditions would
be very small.
In order to approach the ideal condition, we can consider rather long codes together with scrambling
[14], [20], [21]. Under the hypothesis that the scrambler can approach the perfect scrambling condition,
as defined in [21], the BER is about half the FER; so, the eavesdropper’s performance is strongly affected
by his degraded channel.
For the derivation of Λth we consider the density evolution technique, whose core is represented by
the following recursion [22]:
ξi = Ψ
−1
((
Ψ
(
2Ec
σ2
+ (wc − 1)ξi−1
))wr−1)
. (12)
In (12), ξi denotes the mean of a randomly chosen message from a check node in the associated Tanner
graph at iteration i, Ec is the energy per codeword bit, σ2 is the noise variance, wc and wr are the
parity-check matrix column and row weights, respectively, while the function Ψ is defined as follows:
Ψ(x) =
1√
4pix
∫ +∞
−∞
tanh(y/2)e−
(y−x)2
4x dy. (13)
The decoding algorithm is supposed to perform a maximum number of iterations equal to I . If ξi becomes
greater than 1 for some i ≤ I , this means that the LDPC code is able to correct all errors. Thus, by using
(12), we can obtain the maximum channel noise levels for which the message-passing decoder will be
able to correct all errors, which is also known as the decoding threshold for the specified ensemble of
LDPC codes. For the ease of implementation, we use the approximated version of density evolution which
assumes that all messages are Gaussian and also consistent (that is, with variance equal to twice the mean).
As an example, we have considered a QPSK modulated transmission over the AWGN channel, and
an SNR working point Λ = −2 dB. Using density evolution, we find that Λth ≈ −2 dB for regular
LDPC codes with: i) wc = 3 and code rate 0.25; ii) wc = 4 and code rate 0.15; iii) wc = 5 and code
rate 0.03. We have focused on wc = 3, and used the progressive edge growth algorithm [23] to design
two (almost) regular LDPC codes with rate 0.25 and length 5 000 and 10 000, respectively. With QPSK
modulation, the above code rate corresponds to 0.5 bits per channel use. Their performance has been
assessed through numerical simulations, using the log-likelihood version of the sum-product algorithm
[24] for LDPC decoding. The results obtained are reported in Fig. 2. If we fix the security condition
as to ensure that E experiences a FER ≥ 0.9, this is reached, for both codes, when ΛE ≤ −2.2 dB.
Concerning B’s reliability condition, we can require that the frame error rate he experiences is ≤ 10−4.
This is achieved for ΛR ≥ −1.2 dB, for the first code, and ΛR ≥ −1.45 dB, for the second code. Thus, the
security gap is Sg = 1 dB and Sg = 0.75 dB, respectively. Obviously, using longer codes would further
reduce the security gap.
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Fig. 2. Simulated frame error rate for two LDPC codes with rate 0.25, parity-check matrix column weight 3, codeword length 5 000 and
10 000.
V. OUTAGE-BASED PROTOCOL DESIGN
While it seems reasonable to assume that the legitimate channel is perfectly known to both the legitimate
terminals, and hence the optimal subcarrier index m and the corresponding value ΛR, assuming knowledge
of the eavesdropper channel state is in general unrealistic. In the following, we assume that the transmitter
only has statistical channel state information (CSI) about the eavesdropper channel.
The legitimate parties must therefore pursue a tradeoff between the key rate they settle for, and the
secret key outage probability (that is the probability that the actual secret key capacity is lower than their
intended rate). A possible approach is to always adjust the transmitted power P so that ΛR has a fixed
value. Then, the secret-key rate must be chosen so that the outage probability is small enough. An example
is reported in Fig. 3, which illustrates the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the achievable secret
key rates (11) assuming the legitimate and eavesdropper channel coefficients are random realizations drawn
from the same fading distribution. We considered an OFDM system with M = 256 subcarriers, CP length
µ = 16, that is, transmitting over frequency selective channels with length LR = LE = µ. Both the channel
impulse responses towards B and E have independent Rayleigh fading taps with exponentially decaying
power delay profile (PDP) and ΓR =
∑
i E {|gR(i)|2} = −10 dB and ΓE =
∑
i E {|gE(i)|2} = −10 dB.
However, the transmission power P is adjusted in order to guarantee ΛR = −1 dB. We see that by fixing
an outage probability of 10−3 we should aim at a secret key rate R = 0.28 bit per channel use. For the
sake of comparison, we also show in the figure the CDF of the achievable secrecy rate for the same
system and with the same input. Observe that the secrecy rate is always much lower than the secret-key
rate with public discussion and may result in a zero rate with very high probability. On the other hand,
when the eavesdropper average SNR is much lower than the one of the main channel, the achievable rates
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Fig. 3. CDF of the achievable secret key rates and secrecy rates when both the channels to B and E have an exponential PDP with
ΓR = ΓE = −10 dB, and the transmitted power P is adjusted so that ΛR = −1 dB.
for the two schemes are quite close, as shown in Fig. 4.
Notice that, in order to characterize the secret-key outage probability, it is important to determine the
statistical description of the random variable ΛE. In the Rayleigh fading case, as multiplying a complex
Gaussian random variable by a constant phase term does not change its distribution, it can be seen that
ΛE is distributed as
Λ˜E =
1
M

LE−1∑
n=1
(
n∑
i=1
gE(i)
)2
+ (N − LE + 1)
(
LE∑
i=1
gE(i)
)2
+
LE−1∑
n=1
(
LE∑
i=n+1
gE(i)
)2 . (14)
Then, Λ˜E can be easily rewritten as the quadratic form Λ˜E = γ∗Cγ, in which γ ∼ CN (0, ILE) and
C is a positive semidefinite matrix function of the system parameters M,N and of the channel PDP.
Therefore, ΛE is distributed as the sum of independent exponential random variables with means equal
to the eigenvalues of C, λ1(C), . . . , λLE(C). Then, the CDF of ΛE is obtained as
FΛE(ϑ) =
LE∑
i=1
λi(C)
LE−1∏
j 6=i(λi(C)− λj(C))
(
1− e− ϑλi(C)
)
. (15)
Similarly, also when considering the practical solution based on the used of LDPC codes for the wiretap
channel scenario, described in Section IV, we can easily assess the effect of knowing E’s channel only
in statistical terms. After having defined the security condition in terms of Eve’s frame error probability,
which implies ΛE < Λth − ε, we can obtain the security outage probability as follows:
P {ΛE ≥ Λth − ε} = 1− FΛE(Λth − ε). (16)
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Fig. 4. CDF of the achievable secret key rates and secrecy rates when both the channels to B and E have an exponential PDP with
ΓR = −10 dB and different values of ΓE, and the transmitted power P is adjusted so that ΛR = −1 dB.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the problem of information theoretical secret-key agreement by sharing randomness
at low power over an OFDM link, in the presence of an eavesdropper.
The low power assumption greatly simplifies the design and performance evaluation of the optimal
scheme, even in a fading channel scenario and when the potential eavesdropper cannot be modeled as an
OFDM receiver. In fact, by leveraging the analogy with a Gaussian MIMO channel, we have shown that
the randomness sharing phase can be designed with complete ignorance of the eavesdropper channel state,
without loss of optimality. It results in a QPSK modulation over the subcarrier that exhibits the maximum
amplitude of the legitimate channel frequency response. As a further consequence, LDPC codes, and their
efficient soft decoding techniques can be employed effectively for information reconciliation, or directly
as codes for the wiretap channel.
We have also provided an outage formulation and have explored the tradeoff between the secret key
rate and the probability of secrecy outage, for proper dimensioning of the scheme.
We point out that a similar approach can also be used for higher transmitted powers, although, in that
case, a water-filling power distribution on the legitimate channel frequency response is suboptimal for
randomness sharing. However, it is shown in [6, Section V] to provide satisfactory results, and to achieve
secret-key capacity again in the high power limit. The design of a protocol exploiting this solution will
be pursued in our future work.
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